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A b s t r a c t . The article aims at analyzing the principle which determines the acceptability and 
correctness o f nominalizations performed upon sentences o f the type: NP-Cop-AP. The discourse 
was initiated by Chomsky (1972), who demonstrated the fact that the correctness o f TNOm is 
established by processes taking place in SS, thus suggesting that the analysis o f SS might shed 
light on the nature o f the underlying DS processes. This view was lated supported by evidence 
coming from the analysis o f the lexical features o f NP and AP, carried out by Postal (1974). Thus 
discussion was initiated as to the role o f  ‘the lexicalist hypothesis’ and ‘lexicalism’ in sentence 
derivation.
The author o f the article discusses the validity o f 'the lexicalist hypothesis’, which main­
tains that lexical features alone can suffice for the explanation o f the acceptability o f TN0M applied 
to strings NP-Cop-AP. She claims that the resort to the lexical features needs to be made with 
respect to, as she calls them, elliptic structures, i. e. structures with shifted designations.
In the search for the rule determining the correctness o f  TNOm> the author considers such 
principles as: Chomskean observation o f its dependence upon the ‘rough similarity’ between SS 
and DS (Chomsky 1972), Postal’s analysis o f agentivity (Postal 1974), the role o f the antecedent 
of the implied subject o f the infinitive phrase (whenever it is contained in such structures) and, as 
she calls it, TNOM-over-TNOM principle. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the acceptability 
of TNom can be assumed to be determined by the syntactic process. The author names it TNOm- 
over-TNOM constraint and analyzes it on the selected corpus o f English and Polish sentences.
As the theory of generative grammar developed, Chomsky realized the fact that 
the observation of surface structure (SS) can significantly contribute to the un­
derstanding o f the underlying deep structure (DS) (Chomsky 1972:104). This 
concept was analyzed on the example o f nominalizing transformations applied 
to sentences:
John is certain  that B ill w ill leave.
John is certain  to leave.
It was noticed that while T NOm  can be applied to the first sentence, with the re­
sulting nominal phrase:
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Joh n 's certa in ty  that B ill w ill leave,
it was not possible to do the same with the latter: the TNOM renders the resulting 
phrase:
*John’s  certa in ty  to  leave,
ungrammatical. Chomsky offered the explanation o f this phenomenon in terms 
of the influence which the sequencing o f units in the surface structure has on the 
applicability o f this transformation. In other words, as Chomsky suggested, 
whenever the lay-out o f constituents in SS roughly corresponded with the lay­
out o f corresponding markers in DS, the T NOm  produced a grammatical phrase. 
On the other hand, if  SS was markedly different from DS, the phrase resulting 
from the application o f T NOm  was ungrammatical.
The concomitant o f this observation is that the correctness of the nominal 
phrase is determined by the position o f grammatical subject with respect to the 
corresponding logical subject. This observation reveals that, whenever the 
grammatical subject (i.e. a unit occupying a pre-verbal position in SS) required 
that in the underlying kernel sentence its logical counterpart takes on the post­
verbal position, TNOm violates grammatically. Hence the assumption was 
formed that whether NP takes on either pre- or post-verbal position in DS, has 
to be related to the presence o f a feature [+Agent] marking this NP (Postal; 
1974:53-54). In DS, NP marked as [+Agent] has to take on the pre-verbal posi­
tion, i.e. the position o f a subject, and, conversely, NP marked as [-Agent] takes 
on the post-verbal position, i.e. the position o f an object. This clearly implies 
that the process o f terminal string derivation which underlies a surface structure, 
is determined by lexical markers adjoining subsequent symbols in a string. Se­
mantic interpretation interferes with the organization and lay-out o f the terminal 
string.
This view was later undermined by Chomsky (1975) who noticed structural 
affinity passive statements shared with kernel strings NP-Cop-AP.
It can hardly be accidental that the English passive makes use o f  the copula and 
that the verb m orphology is so clearly analogous to certain adjectival construc­
tions. This fact may w ell find its place within a theory o f  surface-structure seman­
tic interpretation, making essential use o f  the subject-predicate constructions in 
surface structure, the theory o f  traces, and other related ideas. W e have been oper­
ating so far on the assumption that surface structure alone undergoes semantic in­
terpretation. But there are som e obvious objections to this conjecture (Chomsky 
1975:114-116).
Chomsky in his earlier project o f the theory of government and binding (GB) 
(Chomsky 1981) diminished the role o f the lexicalist hypothesis in sentence
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derivation, reckoning NP-movement transformational; and thus characterized as 
syntactic, not lexical process.
I f  w e consider GB, it is apparent that there is a sense in which, with respect to the 
treatment o f  N P-m ovem ent relationships, it is the m ost conservative o f  the theories 
w e are mainly considering here [generalized phrase structure grammar -  GPSG, 
lexical-functional grammar -  LFG, relational grammar RG -  author’s remark] 
(M cC loskey 1988:49).
Still even in his cautious approach towards acknowledging the role of the lexi- 
calist hypothesis in linguistic processes, Chomsky reckoned the significance of 
theta roles in the functioning o f such operations as NP-movement.
The ‘Lexicalist H ypothesis’, to oversim plify som ewhat, is the claim  that a certain 
amount o f  what is usually regarded as ‘syntax’ is actually done in the lexicon, 
logically  ‘preceding’ the application o f  any strictly syntactic rules; transforma­
tions. ... all versions o f  Chomsky an theory since the early 7 0 ’s assume som e ver­
sion o f  i t .... Indeed, REST has been getting increasingly ‘lexicalist’ in recent years 
(T  auber, jtauber.com).
The question arises whether the labelling of respective units in a string NP-Cop- 
AP with lexical markers is crucial for determining the applicability o f T NOm - 
The analysis might help alleviate the feeling of uneasiness posed by friction 
resulting form REST being constantly confronted with ‘lexicalist’ solutions 
offered, for example, by LFG.
The analysis proposed here will take the following corpus o f English sen­
tences and their Polish equivalents into account.
(1 1)  The raven  is tam ed. (1 2 ) K ruk je s t  osw ojony.
(2 i) The ca t is fluffy. (2 2) K ot j e s t  puszysty.
(3 1) P eter is annoying. (32) P io tr j e s t  denerw ujący.
(4 0  G arlic  is healthy. (4 2) C zosnek j e s t  zdrow y.
(5 1) The car is easy  to  repair. (5 2) Sam och ód  je s t  ła tw y do napraw ienia.
(6 0  The door is open. (6 2) D rzw i są  otwarte.
(7 i) The w heel is spun. (7 2) K oło  je s t  obracane.
All sentences represent the type NP-Cop-AP. (1) and (2) differ only in that in 
(2) Past Participle is used (Chomsky claimed (1975:114) that this difference is 
negligible on the level o f deep structure). Interestingly enough, with respect to 
both (1) and (2), the application o f TNOM renders strings:
I (1 aj) tam eness o f  the raven  
(2 a 0  fluffiness o f  the cat
( la 2) osw ojen ie  kruka  
(2a2) pu szysto ść  kota
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well-formed. On the other hand, the same transformation T NOm violates the 
well-formedness o f (3), (4) and (5):
II (3a[) * P e te r ’s annoyingness (3a2) * denerw uj ącość P iotra  
(4aO * health iness o f  g a r lic  (4a2) *zdrow ość czosnku  
(5a i) * easiness o f  c a r ’s  repa ir  (4a2) *łatw ość napraw ien ia  sam ochodu
though (4a2) may seem dubious in this respect. For the native speaker of Polish 
this sentence probably seems acceptable, giving rise to the conjecture that its 
grouping in the set o f unacceptable nominalizations might not be justifiable. 
This will become the matter o f further analysis.
The nominalization o f (6) and (7) l^ads to the formation o f grammatical 
nominal phrases, likewise:
III (6a i) the openness o f  the door  (6a2) o tw arcie  (się) drzw i 
(7a!) the spinn ing o f  the w h eel (7a2) obracanie (się) koła.
with the implication that these sentences both in English and in Polish require 
reflexivity for the correct handling o f transformational processes related to 
them. (In English they would be sentences o f the type NP-V,-Complement: The 
door opened itself. The wheel spins itself.)
The above examples, grouped in I, II, and III, cast doubt on the assump­
tion that the acceptability o f TNOm corresponds to agentivity. Out of all phrases 
subjected to TNOm, only the NP in (3), (group II) was marked as [+Agent] be­
yond any doubts. Interestingly enough, it featured in the group which also con­
tained a NP marked as [-Agent] (5).
Yet one more observation to make regarding group II is that all sentences 
contained in this group are elliptic. Say, in (4) Garlic is healthy AP does not 
assign a certain property to the object designated by NP, i. e. to garlic, but, in­
stead, implicitly describes the state which, in itself, is the consequence of the 
fact that someone eats garlic. Thus the state or property designated by AP in this 
sentence accompanies a certain activity, which albeit, not mentioned in the sen­
tence itself, is the necessary premise on which the understanding o f this sen­
tence rests. This shows that the understanding o f this sentence is built on antici­
patory processes, wherein the mind on hearing the sentence moves from what is 
explicit in it, back to the set o f implicit premises necessary for the formation of 
the meaning o f this sentence. The process at work can be visualized as follows:
PREM ISE 1: the f ir s t  s ta g e  o f  the an tic ipa tory p ro cess  a t w ork in deep  structure- 
constitu tion  o f  the sen ten ce's meaning: the sen tence in terpreted  as a  conclusion in 
the syllogism :
NP Cop AP
I  am healthy
The Nature of Llinguistic Processes 143
PREMISE 2: the seco n d  sta g e  o f  the an ticipa tory p ro cess  in vo lved  in m eaning constitu­
tion: the m edia ting  sentence linking the fa c t  expressed  above w ith  the fa c t  that a 
certain  activ ity  is p erfo rm ed
NP, Cop NP2
I ea t garlic
The speaker in forming sentence (4) has to be aware o f the fact that the mental 
process leading to the constitution o f meaning involves the anticipation o f both 
premises. The speaker also has to anticipate the fact that the passing through 
stage 2 requires that the sentence be passivized:
Tpass Garlic is eaten.
It is only in this form that the sentence will enable to pass on to the next stage of 
the ellipsis-derivation, where garlic features as subject, not the object:
G arlic  is healthy.
The same staging in the sentence derivation can be attributed to sentence (3). It 
thus takes on the form of the following syllogism (where, again, just as it was 
before, both -  passivization and substitution processes are involved):
PREMISE 1: I am annoyed.
PREMISE 2: I  ta lk  to  P eter.
CONCLUSION: P eter is annoying.
My annoyance reveals itself as a result o f an implicitly ‘bracketed’ activity un­
dertaken with Peter. When it comes to the third sentence set in this group, the 
car is easy to repair, there is also a shift o f the attributive function o f AP (easy). 
While SS ‘attributes’ it to the car, DS reveals that easy should be attributed to a 
certain fact expressed as:
[for smn [ to  repa ir the c a r ] ]  is easy.
The above analyses were made in the way that emphasized the semantic aspect 
of the sentence constitution. The question arises whether the analysis carried out 
from this angle is plausible enough for the explanation o f linguistic facts, i.e. 
whether it can be considered to have the explanatory capacity for all possible 
occurrences o f barred nominalizations.
Yet another problem arises concerning the very nature o f the semantic 
analysis, i.e. to what extent it adopts the mode o f explanation similar to that
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which helps cognize extralinguistic phenomena. In other words, does semantic 
analysis allow for linguistic processes involved in the forming and understand­
ing o f meaning to be clearly told apart from the underlying psychological proc­
esses, which take place whenever something is being asserted about the world? 
The uniformity o f categorization o f both the world and language implies princi­
pal affinity between apriori rules involved in world perception and apriori rules 
involved in sentence perception. However tempting (mainly due to its simplic­
ity) this view may be, it seems entirely unsubstantiated. The belief that both the 
phenomenal world and the world of concepts are divinely preordained (to use 
Lebniz’s terminology) seems too far-fetched to pass the test o f scientific valid­
ity. The danger o f a linguist getting entangled in psychological processes which 
constitute human ability to cognize the world can be illustrated on the example 
o f sentences from group III where, in fact, it seems dubious if the linguist’s 
decision as to whether treat the door and the wheel as marked [+Agent] or [- 
Agent], is truly determined by intrinsic linguistic processes, and not -  by the 
way human beings perceive phenomena. As James Tauber remarked,
in the ‘real w orld’ do things rotate or are they rotated? [If] such patterns are lin­
guistically im posed, ... w e are dealing with facts about linguistic patterns, not 
about ‘real w orld’ phenom ena ... after all it’s primarily (human) language w e are 
claim ing to study here, not physics. W e are dealing here not only with the relation­
ship between human language and phenomenal (i.e. ‘real world) reality but that 
betw een human language and human cognition, i.e. how  w e as human beings per­
ceive phenomenal reality (Tauber, jtauber.com).
Taking this into account one might doubt whether the marker [+/- Agent] can 
be plausibly used as a criterion for differentiating between acceptable and unac­
ceptable nominalizations. If so, the very decision as to which utterances are 
acceptable, would be determined rather by psychological, not linguistic proc­
esses.
With regard to the elliptic sentences analysed before, it is unclear how to 
‘delineate’ the class o f sentences which require for their understanding the ap­
plication o f anticipatory processes and tell them apart from sentences which do 
not. If  we assume that for the understanding o f the elliptic structures o f the type 
grouped in II, a certain set o f premises stated as implied sentences is required, it 
turns out that practically for every sentence it is possible to find a correspoding 
anticipatory action which, so to say, ‘enhances’ its understanding:
(8 ) The book is in teresting -  an tic ip a ted  prem ise: [P R O  to  re a d  tj;
K siqzka  j e s t  c iekaw a  (w  czytaniu)
(9 ) G arlic  is healthy -  an tic ip a ted  prem ise: [P R O  to  ea t];
C zosnek  j e s t  zd ro w y  (do jed zen ia )
(10 ) P eter is hungry  -  a n tic ipa ted  p rem ise  [P R O  to ea t];
P io tr je s t  g lodn y  (w  jedzen iu )
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The process o f selection o f elliptic structures based on the logical criterion 
which states that for any elliptic structure the corresponding anticipatory struc­
ture which significantly contributes to its meaning (or without which the under­
standing o f its meaning would be barred) has to be found, seems, therefore, 
ineffective. The speaker’s decision as to where the anticipatory structure is nec­
essary, and where it merely ‘enhances’ what is already clearly stated in the ana­
lyzed sentence, cannot be subjected to unequivocal logical procedure, and thus, 
becomes a matter o f tenuous, hardly tangible and quite recondite considerations. 
It is no longer the matter o f logic.
With respect to the set above ((8), (9), (10)) it can be noticed that in (8) 
and (9) the null subject PRO of the embedded phrase does not have its antece­
dent in the main subject. In other words, the movement from PRO (implicit 
subject of infinitive clauses) to the main subject is barred:
(8a) The book  is in teresting [P R O  to re a d  t], where m ovem ent from P R O  to the book  is 
barred and, respectively, T K O m  i s  barred:
(8b) *the b o o k ’s  interest,
(9a) G arlic is healthy [P R O  to  ea t t], where m ovem ent from P R O  to g a rlic  is barred, 
and so is T \o \i - 
(9b) * g a r l ic ’s healthiness
On the other hand, the implicit subject o f the infinitive phrase in (10) has its 
antecedent in the main subject:
(10a) P eter is hungry [P R O  to ea tj. Here m ovem ent from P R O  to P eter  is allow ed and 
TNOm's allowed, likewise:
(1 Ob) P eter's hunger
The same works for:
(11) P eter is w illin g  [P R O  to help others], thus yielding the acceptable nominalization: 
(11a) P e te r ’s  w illingness [P R O  to  help others],
This procedure, however, fails to account for the unacceptability o f structures 
such as:
(121) P eter is annoying [P R O  behaves in a certain  w a y ]
(122) P io tr je s t  denerw ujący (w  sw oim  zachow aniu),
where, although implicit PRO is properly bound by its antecedent, the nomi­
nalization is barred:
(12ai) * P e te r ’s annoyingness,
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The same can be, conversely, showed in 
(13 ) The task  is ea sy  [P R O  to  do  tj,
where the implicit PRO is not bound by the main subject and still the TNOm 
yields the correct structure:
(13 a i) the easiness o f  the task  (13 a2) ła tw ość  zadania.
From the above considerations the conclusion has to be drawn that the analysis 
o f structures in terms o f allowability o f T NOm , cannot be based on the following 
criteria:
(a) agentivity o f  the N P  functioning as the main subject (Postal 1974:53-54),
(b) similarity o f  SS and the corresponding DS (Chom sky 1972:104),
(c) the presence o f  anticipatory semantic processes involved in the understanding o f  
the sentence,
(d) the relatedness o f  the im plicit P R O  to its main subject antecedent.
For each o f the mentioned criteria it was possible to find an example defying its 
plausibility and universal applicability.
It may still, however, be possible to uphold the view that the notion of el­
lipsis will help understand sentences in which the clarity of the message be­
comes blurred as a result o f the applied shift in designation (i.e. the fact that the 
role o f feature attribution taken on by AP, allows AP to move more or less 
freely from its own object to other objects holding semantic ties with it) just as 
it was in Garlic is healthy. This would corroborate the assumption that the un­
derstanding o f the sentence rests on the analysis o f selectional features in the 
way that whenever a shift o f attribution is performed, say, in:
(1 5 1) C rops are  rea d y  f o r  h arvestin g  (1 52) Z boże j e s t  go to w e  do zbioru
where the implied meaning is represented in the ellipsis:
(1 5ai) C rops are ripe  (1 5a,) Z boże j e s t  do jrza le
F arm ers are  rea d y  f o r  h arvesting  R olnicy s ą  g o to w i do  zbioru
C rops are  rea d y  f o r  h arvestin g  Z boże j e s t  go to w e  do zbioru
it must be possible for the hearer to trace the linguistic process up to the point 
where ‘kernel designations’ (i.e. the fact that ready characterizes farmers, not 
crops, and vice versa, ripe characterizes crops, not farmers) for particular lin­
guistic units are retrieved. However, the applicability of TNOm is dependent on
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the process which is intrinsically syntactic. The syntactic rule governing this 
transformation may be referred (by analogy to A-over-A principle; Chomsky 
1972:52) to as T NOM -o v e r -T NOM constraint. It stipulates that double nominaliza- 
tions are barred. Thus from
The car is repa ired ,
it is possible to derive nominal phrase
the car's rep a ir , but from 
The c a r ’s repa ir w as easy ,
it is no longer possible to derive
*the easiness o f  c a r ’s  repair.
This explanation would account for the fact that the legitimacy o f its Polish 
equivalent łatwość naprawienia samochodu seems less dubious. Polish, by 
means o f inflection, allows for such structures to retain their clarity in spite of 
the fact that they entail double nominalization.
REFERENCES
Chomsky, N.A. (1972): Language and mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Chomsky, N.A. (1975): Reflections on language. New York: Pantheon 
Chomsky, N.A. (1981): Lectures on government and binding. Dordrecht: Foris 
Chomsky, N.A. (1986): Barriers. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
McCloskey, J. (1988): Syntactic theory. In: F.J. Newmeyer (eds.), Linguistics: The Cambridge 
survey. Cambridge: CUP.
Postal, P. (1980): The domain o f syntax. Translated as: P. Postal, Domena składni. In: B. Stanosz 
(ed.), Język w świetle nauki.' Warszawa: PWN.
Tauber, J. Synthinar: The syntactic theory seminar, jtauber.com.
